Effect and mechanisms of alternative livelihood options for improving herder engagement with ecological compensation policy-a study of outcomes under China’s “Grassland ecological compensation policy”

doi:10.11686/cyxb2023345

Abstract

Abstract:

The implementation of China’s ecological compensation policy whereby herders are paid to control overgrazing to facilitate environmental protection， still faces the challenge of ineffectiveness. The constraint on livelihoods determined by resource limitations stands out as a significant factor contributing to the failure of the ecological compensation policy. Exploring ways to optimize the implementation and impact of ecological compensation through the lens of alternative livelihoods can offer a fresh approach to reconcile existing research on the connection between ecological compensation and sustaining livelihoods. Moreover， this approach can also contribute to furthering the reform efforts with respect to ecological compensation policy. This study， using data on outcomes under the grassland ecological compensation policy （GECP）， conducted interval data regression and bivariate probit regression analyses using 2 years of tracking survey data from Gansu and Qinghai provinces. Building on the herders’ grazing prohibition behavioral experiment， this study empirically examined the impact of herders’ alternative livelihood opportunities over the past 6 years and village-level alternative livelihood measures over the past 4 years on their willingness to accept （WTA） compensation for grazing prohibition. Our study considers the perspectives of non-pastoral employment and employment training， with the aim of elucidating the enhancement effect of existence of alternative livelihood options on the effectiveness of the GECP. The findings reveal that the alternative livelihood opportunities of herders are crucial in determining their WTA grazing bans and optimizing the effectiveness of compensation policies under the current policy settings. However， only high-skilled non-pastoral employment with high income and stability can effectively contribute to improved WTA. Additionally， the provision of employment training services at the village level is beneficial in decreasing the WTA of herders and improving the effectiveness of GECP under the current compensation standards， although this effect requires a cumulative period of 3-4 years to become evident. Therefore， in the process of promoting ecological compensation reform， we should focus on balancing the ecological environment protection and the interests of the compensated subjects， fully consider the alternative livelihood transformation and development issues of the compensated subjects， provide them with more comprehensive and effective support， and promote construction of a social ethos with a strong ecological focus.

Key words: grassland ecological compensation policy, alternative livelihood, non-farm work training, willingness to accept, behavioral economics

Liu-fang SU, Huan-guang QIU, Hui-fang LIU, Ling-ling HOU. Effect and mechanisms of alternative livelihood options for improving herder engagement with ecological compensation policy-a study of outcomes under China’s “Grassland ecological compensation policy”[J]. Acta Prataculturae Sinica, 2024, 33(6): 29-46.

Figures/Tables 12

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受偿方案编号 Compensation scheme number	第一次投标值 First bid value	第二次投标低值 Second low bid value	第二次投标高值 Second high bid value
1	45	22.5	120
2	120	45	300
3	300	120	1200
4	1200	300	2550
5	2550	1200	4500
6	4500	2550	7200

受偿方案编号 Compensation scheme number	第一次投标值 First bid value	第二次投标低值 Second low bid value	第二次投标高值 Second high bid value
1	45	22.5	120
2	120	45	300
3	300	120	1200
4	1200	300	2550
5	2550	1200	4500
6	4500	2550	7200

时间Year	类型Type	数值Value
2020	参与低技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households participating in low-skilled non-farm work	22.93
	低技能非牧就业收入占比Share of income from low-skilled non-farm work	9.84
	参与高技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households participating in high-skilled non-farm work	18.02
	高技能非牧就业收入占比Share of income from high-skilled non-farm work	6.25
2015-2020	6年均不参与低技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households not participating in low-skilled non-farm work during 6 years	71.77
	6年间有参与低技能非牧就业但收入稳定性较低的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in low-skilled non-farm work with low income stability during 6 years	16.94
	6年间有参与低技能非牧就业且收入稳定性较高的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in low-skilled non-farm work with high income stability during 6 years	11.29
	6年均不参与高技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households not participating in high-skilled non-farm work during 6 years	70.97
	6年间有参与高技能非牧就业但收入稳定性较低的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in high-skilled non-farm work with low income stability during 6 years	8.47
	6年间有参与高技能非牧就业且收入稳定性较高的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in high-skilled non-farm work with high income stability during 6 years	20.56

时间Year	类型Type	数值Value
2020	参与低技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households participating in low-skilled non-farm work	22.93
	低技能非牧就业收入占比Share of income from low-skilled non-farm work	9.84
	参与高技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households participating in high-skilled non-farm work	18.02
	高技能非牧就业收入占比Share of income from high-skilled non-farm work	6.25
2015-2020	6年均不参与低技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households not participating in low-skilled non-farm work during 6 years	71.77
	6年间有参与低技能非牧就业但收入稳定性较低的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in low-skilled non-farm work with low income stability during 6 years	16.94
	6年间有参与低技能非牧就业且收入稳定性较高的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in low-skilled non-farm work with high income stability during 6 years	11.29
	6年均不参与高技能非牧就业牧户占比Ratio of households not participating in high-skilled non-farm work during 6 years	70.97
	6年间有参与高技能非牧就业但收入稳定性较低的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in high-skilled non-farm work with low income stability during 6 years	8.47
	6年间有参与高技能非牧就业且收入稳定性较高的牧户占比Ratio of households participating in high-skilled non-farm work with high income stability during 6 years	20.56

项目 Item	变量 Variable	定义 Definition	均值 Mean	方差 SD	最小值 Min	最大值 Max
WTA实验变量WTA experiment variables	第一次投标值First bid value	元·hm^-2CNY·ha^-1	1371.109	1543.060	45.0	4500
	第二次投标值Second bid value	元·hm^-2 CNY·ha^-1	1768.458	2021.472	22.5	7200
	第一次选择First choice	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.262	0.441	0	1
	第二次选择Second choice	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.242	0.429	0	1
村级替代性生计措施变量Village-level variables of alternative livelihood measures	2017-2020年提供就业培训年份数Number of years of job training services provided during 2017-2020	年份Year	1.633	1.815	0	4
	2020年是否提供就业培训Whether to provide job training services in 2020	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.419	0.494	0	1
	2019年是否提供就业培训Whether to provide job training services in 2019	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.456	0.499	0	1
	2018年是否提供就业培训Whether to provide job training services in 2018	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.435	0.497	0	1
	2017年是否提供就业培训Whether to provide job training services in 2017	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.323	0.468	0	1
	是否连续3~4年提供就业培训Whether to provide job training services for 3~4 consecutive years	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.415	0.494	0	1
牧户替代性生计特征变量 Household-level variables of alternative livelihood characteristic	2020年低技能非牧就业收入占比Share of income from low-skilled non-farm work in 2020	取值0到1 Ranges from 0 to 1	0.098	0.240	0	1
	2020年高技能非牧就业收入占比Share of income from high-skilled non-farm work in 2020	取值0到1 Ranges from 0 to 1	0.063	0.179	0	1
	2015-2020年低技能非牧就业低稳定性Whether to participate in low-skilled non-farm work with low income stability during 2015-2020^a	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.169	0.376	0	1
	2015-2020年低技能非牧就业高稳定性Whether to participate in low-skilled non-farm work with high income stability during 2015-2020^a	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.113	0.317	0	1
	2015-2020年高技能非牧就业低稳定性Whether to participate in high-skilled non-farm work with low income stability during 2015-2020^b	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.085	0.279	0	1
	2015-2020年高技能非牧就业高稳定性Whether to participate in high-skilled non-farm work with high income stability during 2015-2020^b	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.206	0.405	0	1
控制变量 Control variables	家庭人口数量Household population size	人Capita	4.859	1.953	1	12
	户主年龄Age of household head	岁Years old	51.883	11.553	23	96
	过去5年受灾次数Number of disasters in the past five years	次Times	0.915	1.742	0	10
	距离最近公路的距离Distance from the nearest road	千米km	7.459	14.591	0	80
	是否通宽带Broadband access or not	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.327	0.470	0	1
	是否加入合作社Whether to join a cooperative	是Yes=1，否No=0	0.379	0.486	0	1
	草场经营面积Grassland area	万hm² 10⁴ ha	0.056	0.158	0	1.267
	省份Province	甘肃Gansu=0 青海Qinghai=1	0.621	0.486	0	1